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1. Introduction 
Most political actors have recognized the Marshall Plan, officially named the European 
Recovery Program (ERP), as the most prolific foreign humanitarian aid program from the 
United States to Western Europe in history. As the United States Congress began to 
construct the proposal, it requested that the Brookings Institute conduct a comprehensive 
study and provide recommendations. On January 22, 1948, Brookings produced its findings 
for structure, focus, and operating procedures of the Marshall Plan, setting the course for the 
ERP. Brookings’ recommendations confirmed the conditions in Europe and affirmed the 
necessity of relief. The report offered consideration for the construction of a new and 
separate American agency. Even more, Brookings offered recommendations that an 
American be appointed to manage the recovery program in each nation-state receiving aid. 1  
As the United States Congress concentrated on identifying nation-states to participate in the 
recovery program, it was apprehensive on helping Germany, Japan, Italy, and its allies. 
From1936 through 1945, Germany, Japan, Italy, and its allies were primarily responsible for 
establishing an alliance known as the Axis Powers. The Axis Powers consisted of nation-states 
that had the ability to use their power on a global scale (i.e., Germany, Italy, Japan, Hungary, 
Romani, Bulgaria) versus Allies (United States, Britain, France, USSR, Australia, Belgium, 
Brazil, Canada, China, Denmark, Greece, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, South 
Africa, and Yugoslavia).2 3 4 The United Nations was hesitant to help the Axis alliance as a 
result of previous war activities. Figure 1 is a synopsis of the Axis Powers and war campaigns.  
                                                                 
1 Brookings Institution, The Marshall Plan Retrieved on February 2, 2012 from 
http://www.brookings.edu/about/History/marshallplan.aspx 
2 Pre and Post-War (1939-1945). Axis Powers. Info please, Retrieved on February 16, 2012 from 
http://www.infoplease.com/ipa/A0001288.html 
3 Louden, R. (2007). Great -Power: The World We Want. United Stares of American: Oxford University Press US. 187-190 
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Figure 1. Shows a Synopsis of the Axis Powers and War Campaigns. 5 
                                                                                                                                                                   
4 Harrison, M. (2000). The Economics of World War II: Six Great Powers in International Comparison. Paperback 
edition. Cambridge, England, UK: Cambridge University Press, 10. 
5 Ibid 2 
1939 (September 1) Germany attacks Poland and annexes Danzig; Britain and France give 
Hitler an ultimatum, declare war (September 3); German battleship Admiral Graf 
Spee is destroyed (December 17) 
1940 Nazis attack the Netherlands Belgium, and Luxembourg (May 10); 
(June 10) Italy declares war on France and Britain; attacks France 
(November 10); Nazis attack England 
1941 Germans launch attack in Balkans; Yugoslavia surrenders to General Mihajilovic, 
continues guerrilla warfare; Tito leads left-wing guerrillas (April 17); Nazi attacks 
Athens; remnants of British Army quit Greece (April 27); Soviet Union attacks 
Russia (June 22); Atlantic Charter: Prime Minister Winston Churchill and President 
Franklin D. Roosevelt agree on war aims (August 14). Japan attacks Pearl Harbor, 
Philippines, Guam, forces the United States into war, the United States Pacific fleet 
crippled (December 7); The United States and Britain declare war on Japan. 
Germany and Italy declare war on the United States Congress declares war on those 
nations (December 11) 
1942 Britain surrenders Singapore to Japan (February 15); the United States forces Bataan 
Peninsula in Philippines surrender (April 9); the United Nations and Filipino troops 
on Corregidor Island in Manila Bay unconditionally surrender to Japan (May 6). 
Village of Lidice in Czechoslovakia razed the Nazis (June 10); The United States and 
Britain land in French North Africa (November 8) 
1943 Prime Minister Winston Churchill and President Franklin D. Roosevelt agree on an 
unconditional surrender objective during the Casablanca Conference (January 14 -
24); German sixth Army surrenders to Stalin in Russia (February 1-2); Nazis trapped 
on Cape Bon, ending war in Africa (May 12); Mussolini overthrown; Badoglio 
named premier (July 25); Allied troops land on Italy inland after conquest of Sicily 
(September 3); Italy surrenders (September 8); Nazis seize Rome (September 10); 
Cairo Conference: Franklin D. Roosevelt, Winston Churchill, and Chiang Kai-shek 
pledge to defeat Japan to free Korea November 22-26); Tehran Conference: Franklin 
D. Roosevelt, Winston Churchill, Stalin agree on invasion plans (November 28- 
December 1) 
1944 The United States and British troops land at Anzio on west Italian coastline and hold 
strategic position (January 22), United States troops enter Rome (June 4); D-Day: Allies 
launch Normandy invasion (June 6); Paris, France is liberated (August 25); Athens 
freed by Allies (October 20); America attacks Philippines (October 20); Germans 
launch counter-offensive in Belgium in the Battle of the Bulge (December 16) 
1945 Yalta Agreement signed by Franklin D. Roosevelt, Winston Churchill and Stalin to 
establish plans for occupation of Germany, to return Soviet Union lands taken by 
Germany and Japan; USSR (Russia) agrees to develop treaty with China (February 
11); Mussolini killed at Lake Como (April 28); Admiral Doenitz takes command in 
Germany; suicide of Hitler is announced (May 1); Berlin is conquered (May 2); 
Germany signs unconditional surrender terms at Rheims (May 7); Allies declare V-E 
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Moreover, nearly two years following World War II, the proposed Marshall Plan became 
law in the United States Congress under the Economic Cooperation Act of April 1948. The 
most conspicuous missed opportunity in constructing the Marshall Plan, by its originators 
beyond governmental divisions, was the absence of an established budget. At this time, 
there were no monetary funds allocated for financial budgetary committees’ approval, yet, 
according to the Brookings Institute, a few years into Congress’ enacting of the ERP, Europe’s 
trade and industry production rose “25 percent exceeding pre-war levels.” Further reports 
indicated their economic market increased by 200 percent within three years.  
By the end of 1952, the United States had transferred aid to Europe in excess of $13 billion in 
economic and technical assistance grants and loans to stimulate economic growth, political 
proficiency, and revitalize free trade while avoiding the utopian promises or military 
menace of communism. European nation-states, which benefitted from ERP, were the Axis 
Powers and allies (i.e., Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, West Germany, Great Britain, 
Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, 
Switzerland, and Turkey). Subsequently, these nation-states formed the Organization for 
European Economic Cooperation (OEEC). The aim of OEEC was defined as, nation-states 
needs consistent with the United Nation’s objectives on trade and economic cooperation 
between allies (Alvarez-Cuadrado, 2008).  
According to historical archives, the aim of the Marshall Plan was to increase productivity, 
improve economic growth and economic policies (Cowen, 1985, p. 65). Conceivably, it was 
the most expensive foreign policy initiative ever attempted in peacetime (Machado, 2008). 
Still, the perception of the Marshall Plan, post-warfare, varies by most Americans and 
Europeans from social colonization to unadulterated philanthropy. Conversely, this chapter 
will not address every historical consistency or inconsistency surrounding the Marshall 
Plan, it will respond to literature that has defined missed opportunities to obliterate 
European nation-states from foreign humanitarian assistance dependency.  
1.1. Origins 
In an arduous battle to recover from an imploding financial system, Europe’s export/import 
market was at the brink of collapse. During this weakened state, the Soviet Union, an 
irrepressible communist nation-state declared its intent to seize Europe. The United States 
recognized that it had too much to gamble on the outcome of this hostile takeover. If the 
Soviet Union were to seize Europe, the United Nations’ export and import market would 
implode as well. The susceptibility of misdirected revenue and impending surrender to the 
Soviet Union’s communist regime compelled the United States to action. Subsequently, the 
United States Congress produced the most quintessential piece of legislation in history to 
impact global strategy and the modernization of Europe.  
The United States Congress advanced the direction and construction of the greatest global 
strategy project in history. This global strategy aimed “to preserve America’s vital tactical 
interests” in Europe. Congress introduced the strategy as a tactic to “mobilize public and 
political support” from both Republicans and Democrats, to take immediate action, and re-
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establish Europe’s sovereignty, and sway bipartisan support. The conventional defense of 
Marshall Aid was presented as a stratagem to save Europe and to ensure the future of 
American Civilization.  
As stratagems were evolving, on June 5, 1947, at Harvard University, Senator Marshall 
spoke to graduates at their commencement ceremony. He proclaimed, “The people of this 
country are distant from the troubled areas of the Earth and it is hard for them to 
comprehend the plight and consequent reactions of the long-suffering peoples, and the 
effect of those reactions on their governments in connections with our efforts to promote 
peace in the world.” The purpose of the plan was to rebuild Europe’s war-torn nation-states, 
to diminish famine and pandemonium in the streets, to promote free trade, and to create 
democracy for its nation and their allies.  
Following months of debate in France, through collaboration of the United States bipartite 
and European partisanship, the ERP, Public Law 472, was accepted with 395 votes for 
acceptance and 75 votes against it (Bossuat, 2008). 6 Thus were born provisions for the 
European Recovery Program (ERP) and European Cooperation Administration in June 
1947, directed by Paul G. Hoffman from Washington, D.C. , the groups established the 
ERP and ECA. After which, the United States implored the Soviet Union and its allies to 
participate in the Marshall Plan. The Soviet ambassador in Washington assumed that the 
ERP was a great initiative and persuaded Stalin to consider the plan. At the outset, Stalin 
too assumed the ERP would benefit all nations of Europe; it seemed a viable resolution for 
Europeans, until he discerned that credits would be extended only on willingness to 
accept economic cooperation and that Germany would also be extended aid, which he 
thought would hamper the Soviets’ ability to exercise influence in Western Germany 
(Wettig, 2008). Further, Stalin surmised that the Eastern Bloc nation-states might defy 
Soviet directives not to accept the aid, potentially causing a loss of control in the Eastern 
Bloc. In addition, the most important prerequisite was that every nation-state to join the 
plan would need to have its economic profile accessed, which the Soviets would not 
accept (p. 66).  
The United States’ built-in limited conditional terms on economic collaboration and 
disclosure of information guaranteed that Stalin and the Soviet Union would never accept 
the conditions stated in the proposal (Alvarez-Cuadrado, 2008). Stalin struggled to negotiate 
with the United States. Still, the United States repudiated any notion to either modify or 
negotiate language (p. 138). Stalin inferred that the plan’s stipulations were much too 
perilous to subscribe. Thereafter calling the United States fascist, pusillanimous, and 
authoritarian, and then declared its allies as enemies in the plan (p. 139). The Soviet Union 
refused to accept humanitarian aid (Robert, 2000), thereby prescribing punishment onto “its 
people to years of depravation under socialist economic schemes and totalitarian régimes.” 
This tumultuous history leads to the central question: Was there a missed opportunity for 
the United States to cultivate relations to reunify and neutralize all nation-states in Europe?  
                                                                 
6 Bossuat, G. (2008) The Marshall Plan: History and Legacy, Chapter 1, Organization for Economic Co-Operation and 
Development (OECD), Publications, at www.oecd.org/publishing/corrigenda, 13 -23. 
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1.1.1. March notes of 1952 
Preceding the “Battle of the Notes,” Stalin drafted a note urging the allies of the United 
States and Europe (United Kingdom, France) to reconsider their objectives to including 
Germany in NATO. In lieu of the American proposal, in a second note, Stalin protested 
nation states’ alliance with Germany. He urged occupying powers to administer elections 
and proceedings instead of the United States, and broader delineation be conscripted by the 
Potsdam Conference. Moreover, prior to the adoption of the European Defense Community 
(EDC) treaty, Stalin sent a third note, citing the Germany Treaty, condemning the purpose of 
the EDC and its intent to “delay negotiations for a peace treaty.” In addition, he insisted that 
Eastern Bloc diplomats surrender to occupy powers at the treaty negotiations. In the last note 
sent, Stalin emphasized the Soviet Union’s stance to nullify election proceedings, and 
treaties that included German powers (Steininger, 1990; Walko, 2002).  
These circumstances led to the “Battle of the Notes” between all U.S. aligned nation-states, 
the Soviet Union, and its allies. Because of language adopted in the EDC, which repudiates 
the Soviet’s proposal to prevent Eastern Germany from joining NATO, in succession 
Germany in the Great Patriotic War demolished the Soviet Union (Smyser, 1999). The 
central question remains: was there a missed opportunity for the United States and its allies 
to cultivate relations to reunify and neutralize all nation-states in Europe?  
1.1.2. Missed opportunity or not? 
The question surrounding whether the United States could have cultivated relations with 
Stalin and the Soviet Union to reunify and neutralize all nation-states under a NATO 
agreement is truly debatable for several reasons. (1) Logically, it is impossible to discern the 
intentions of the Soviet Union; the world will never know whether the Soviet Union would 
have permitted a neutral, democratic, or unified pact with Germany. (2) For certain, the 
German Democratic Republic (GDR) produced greater benefits than conceding to Germany 
as a sovereign state. For example, several of the occupying powers of the Second World War 
reveled in the prestige of such maneuvers as controlling the Eastern German borders, 
Czechoslovakia, and Poland. The GDR governance was a vassal of East Germany. 
Moreover, the Soviet Union easily exploited economic resources from allies and military, 
with the exclusion of the Austrian government. With its unyielding economic growth and 
lack of military strategies, the Soviet Union virtually controlled Austria. Finally, scholars 
have tried to discern whether Germany would have worked collaboratively with the Soviet 
Union. There is a greater probability that (3) the Soviet Union could have subjugated 
Germany through reunification efforts; and (4) Stalin could have hostilely seized Western 
Europe and its allies; however, without integration with all U.S. aligned nation-states, 
subsequently, West Germany might have been far worse economically (Smyser, 1999).  
The argument can be made that the relevance of the March notes in 1952, reflected Stalin’s 
candor and eagerness to reunify and neutralize all nation-states in Europe, while 
simultaneously cultivating relations with the United States under the United Nations 
settlement; creating the possibility of a missed opportunity. Steininger (1990) argued these 
three points: (1) Stalin’s offer was meant seriously, (2) the Western powers intended to 
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sound out Stalin’s’ proposal, and (3) the Adenauer (named after Konrad Adenauer, 
Chancellor of West Germany from 1949 to 1963) policies [to secure West Germany sovereignty] 
were used to intensify Stalin’s momentum to disenfranchise Germany. In opposition, Grami 
(1977) averred the profusion of notes served no purpose to Western Europe; the Soviet 
Union’s intent was clear. Their intent was to create a diversion so that the integration of the 
GDR into the Eastern Bloc became more of a reality. The point being there is no conceivable 
system to discern if either the United States or Western Europe and its allies missed 
opportunities to cultivate relations during the reunification and neutrality proceedings. 
2. Appropriations between 1948 and 1952 
In France, at the Hotêl Talleyrand, the ERP Conference ensued excluding the presence of the 
Soviet Union and its allies. Supportive of the European Recovery Plan, sixteen Western 
European nation-states and allies along with the United States gathered to construct a plan 
to rebuild and synthesize atrophied nation-states. After much debate, an agreement was 
reached and the Europeans sent a reconstruction plan to Washington. At the outset, the 
Europeans requested $22 billion in aid. President Truman countered the proposal with $17 
billion for Congressional approval. Stemming from much opposition, the finance 
appropriations committee initially passed $5 billion, in succession, with influential 
bipartisan support to send $12.5 billion over a span of four years, passed (Grogin, 2001).  
As a result of the ERP Conference, and preceding World War II, President Truman signed in 
to law the Economic Cooperation Act of 1948 (ECA). Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, 
West Germany, the United Kingdom, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the 
Netherlands, Norway, Sweden Switzerland, Turkey, and the United States, accordingly, 
signed a bilateral agreement. The bilateral agreement made certain that all nation-states 
received aid within an egalitarian system. As the threat of the Cold War materialized with 
the Soviet Union, in conjunction with below par constructs of the bilateral agreement, the 
United States Congress through the ECA attained power to question new annual fund 
allocations. As time elapsed, The Marshall Plan (ERP), no longer operable, dissolved about 
11 months before its scheduled end date.  
In the aftermath of the Post-War and remnants of the Marshall Plan (ERP), the redeployment 
of military and economic power left two dominant nations, the United States and the Soviet 
Union. The Axis alliance (i.e., Europe, Asia, Africa, and South America) was ravaged from the 
war. The dominant nations, with competing objectives, each toiled for world governance. The 
United States either wanted to concede to the threat of communism, or to an imploding free 
world. In response to probable security vulnerability, the United States enacted the Mutual 
Security Act of 1951. The purpose of the act was averting communism. Through the act, the 
United States could authorize military, economic, and technical assistance to nation-states 
with the aim of developing their welfare and liberation provisionally in the national interest 
of the United States.7 It created a new, independent, agency -the Mutual Security 
Administration. –Its purpose, to supervise all foreign aid programs including military 
                                                                 
7 Zusman, L., & Helfand, N. Mutual Security Act (1951). Major Acts of Congress. 2004. 
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assistance and economic programs that bolstered the defense capability of United States allies 
(Hogan, 1987). By the end of 1952, the Mutual Security Act (MSA) replaced the ECA. After 
1953, there is no more mention of the ERP. 8 One after the other, bilateral, multilateral, and 
unilateral aid organizations emerged. Figure 2A shows bilateral development assistance 
programs.9 Bilateral aid programs fostered viable economic progress and social stability in 
developing nation-states. Figure 2B shows multilateral aid programs. Multilateral aid 
programs were combination resources, the majority of the programs financed with private 
donations instead of direct government contributions. Unilateral aid funds are direct 
contributions from one nation to other nation-states experiencing natural disasters. Table 1 
shows the top beneficiary scale of aid between 1948 and 1952.  
 
Figure 2. (A) Shows the Level of Development Assistance Programs;  
(B) shows the Multilateral Aid Program Contributors 
                                                                 
8 Encyclopedia of American Foreign Policy, The United States Congress approved about US $5 Billion for European 
military security, and US $1 Billion of defense aid, (2002), 2, 2 - 95  
9 CRS Report for Congress, Foreign Aid: Introductory Overview of U.S. Programs and Policy, April 15, 2004 order 
code: 98-916 at www.crs.gov. 
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U.S. Economic Assistance Under the European Recovery Program 
April 3, 1948 and June 30, 1952 
(in millions of dollars) 
Country Total Grants Loans 
Total for all countries $13,325.80 $11,820.70 $1,505.10 
Austria 67.8 677.8 00 
Belgium-Luxembourg 559.3 419.3 68a 
Denmark 273 239.7 33.3 
France 2,713.60 2,488.00 225.6 
Germany, Federal 
Republic of 
1,390.60 1,173.70 216.9b 
Greece 706.7 706.7 00 
Iceland 29.3 24.3 5.3 
Ireland 147.5 19.3 128.2 
Italy (including Trieste) 4,508.80 1,413.20 95.6 
Netherlands (East indies)c 1,083.50 916.8 166.7 
Norway 255.3 216.1 39.2 
Portugal 51.2 15.1 36.1 
Sweden 107.3 86.9 20.4 
Turkey 225.1 140.1 85 
United Kingdom 3,189.80 2,805.00 384.8 
Regional 407d 407 
Table 1. U. S. Economic Assistance under the European Recovery Program between April 3, 1948 and 
June 30, 1953 (in millions dollars)  
The Marshall Plan is touted as the original course that aggrandized European integration. It 
formed an integral part of the concept of the Euro-Atlantic Alliance Partnership Council 
(EAPC): A NATO organization and multilateral entity which maintained relations between 
non-NATO and NATO nation-states. The Export-Import was an official credit agency 
established in 1934 to provide monetary relief and ease export and imports relations. The 
United Nation Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA) established in 1943 
administered the level of relief to victims of war. North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s 
(NATO), post- World War II, major function was to maintain a level of peace and stability in 
Europe as UNRRA.10 The World Bank’s purpose has been, since 1944, to provide fiscal and 
technical provision to developing nation-states. The Government and Relief in Occupied 
Areas’ (GARIOA) established around 1946, sole resolve, under directives of the United 
                                                                 
10 Geremek, B.(2008).The Marshall Plan and European Integration Chapter 2, Organization for Economic Co-Operation 
and Development (OECD), Publications, at www.oecd.org/publishing/corrigenda, 43 – 49. 
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States, was to allocate and supply goods and services to civilians. Interim Aid was used to 
sustain sovereignty in 1947. Followed by the Treaty of Brussels of 1948, stronger coalitions 
emerged between Belgium, France Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom 
to preserve economic, social, and cultural cooperation.11 Western European Union’s (WEU), 
established in 1954, purpose was to defend alliances throughout Europe. In spite of 
everything, these organizations have an unswerving common view: to ease nation-states 
from circumstances of extreme poverty. The central question being, were there missed 
opportunities to streamline organizations aiding Europe?  
2.1. Missed opportunity or not? 
For years, since the passage of the Foreign Assistance Act (FAA) of 1961, the United States 
Congress has been publicly humiliated for overindulgence based on the perception among 
people who presumably appreciate government trends and practices. Yet for others the 
question remains, were there missed opportunities for the United States to streamline 
organizations aiding Europe? Yes, missed opportunities were ubiquitous. In 2009, the 
Congressional Research Service (CRS) conducted a study to understand the extent of 
misappropriations of aid. Sequentially, a CRS report documented multiple substructures of 
foreign assistance programs and government agencies attributable to the overlapping of 
foreign aid throughout government agencies. The CRS also, proposed immediate 
streamlining of governmental agencies that handle foreign aid distributions. Unfortunately, 
events of September 11, 2001, and the “War on Terror” erupted in flux within departments 
that were cited for the infractions. Moreover, expenditures increased from $15 billion in 
FY2001 to more than $45 billion in FY2007, including supplemental appropriations from the 
State Department (State) and, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). The 
Department of Defense (DOD), the Peace Corps, the Energy and Treasury Departments, the 
Department of Agriculture, Millennium Challenge Corporation (MMCC) formed in 1951, 
and finally the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) and Centers for Disease 
Control and Prevention (CDC) also had increased expenditures.  
In 2007, following a stream of inquiries on how foreign aid disbursements are made, the 
CRS revealed a number of U.S. government agencies (aforementioned) attested to 
expending foreign aid to nation-states with parallel objectives. State financial aid officers, 
conceded that agencies either worked by “cross-purposes” or with intent to duplicate 
constructs reported as different aid objectives. Equally astonishing, in the twenty-first 
century, there were no “overarching mechanisms” in place to access the range of output. 
Consequently, State officers eventually used compendious systems in place among various 
departments and agencies, such as the U.S. National Security Council policy coordination 
committee, to generate new information-sharing technology, and inter-agency staff 
exchanges systems (CRS, 2009). Unfortunately, there remains no innovative processes in 
place that best improve systems of operations among State departments. Figure 3 shows 
overlapping agency foreign assistance activities. 
                                                                 
11 CVCE. The Brussels Treaty of 1948 (n.d.). Retrieved on February 2, 2012 from 
http://www.cvce.eu/obj/european_navigator-en-3467de5e-9802-4b65-8076-778bc7d164d3 
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Figure 3. Overlapping Agency Foreign Assistance Activities12 
3. Aid implementation between 1948 and 1949 
The United States appropriated aid to Western Europe nation-states annually in the form of 
grants, food, supplies, and cash transfers. By the end of World War II, the main commodities 
purchased from ECA were food and fuel. As a condition in the Western Hemisphere, the 
Economic Cooperation Agency (ECA) only arranged transference of aid and purchases. 
What the ECA administrators spent in three years, translated into a contemporary dollar 
equivalence of $1 billion, an enticement to unlawful activity and speculation (Machado, 
2008).  
The United States’ suppliers were paid in local currency and, sequential dollar amounts 
were credited against each respective ERP account. These processes generated income called 
                                                                 
12 CRS: The size of circles is not proportional to each agency’s share of foreign assistance disbursements, which changes 
significantly from year to year. An attempt was made to roughly show the average relative size of agencies’ foreign aid 
activities over the last decade. Areas of overlapping agency jurisdiction in the chart can mean two things. They can 
indicate a joint effort in a particular sector, and/or unrelated agency activities within the same sector. An example of 
the former is food aid, which is funded through the Department of Agriculture but implemented by USAID. The 
HIV/AIDS overlap is an example of the latter, with multiple agencies disbursing PEPFAR funds through their own 
programs. Sometimes both types of overlap occur simultaneously, as with MCC and USAID. MCC implements 
compact agreements independent of USAID, but compacts generally fund long-term development projects similar to 
those carried out by USAID, and the MCC threshold program is implemented by USAID. Retrieved on January 31, 
2011 from www.crs.gov ., 24. 
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counterpart funds. The European government used counterpart funds to reconcile 
outstanding accounts by crediting counterpart coffers; further, the ECA routed proceeds 
from local purchases, equivalent to a tax transfer, into local banks which were subsequently, 
used for debt reduction or domestic investments on behalf of nation-states (p. 43). The 
United States, for its services received 5% of all counterpart funds to insure ERP 
administrative expenses were satisfied.  
Moreover, aid appropriation was in the context of a USD GDP of $258 billion in 1948, in 
excess of $12 billion in U.S. aid to Europe and counted separately from the Marshall Plan 
(Milward, 1984). Successive plans, such as the Mutual Security Plan replaced the Marshall 
Plan mid-1951(Nicholaus, 2008). The threat of the Korean War compromised security for 
nation-states, in accordance creating a greater urgency for aid. Inasmuch “Western Europe 
received $13 billion to rebuild its military infrastructure.” $3.4 billion went towards the 
import of raw materials and semi-manufactured products; $3.2 billion allocated for food, 
feed, and fertilizer; $1.9 billion for machines, vehicles, and equipment; and $1.6 billion for 
fuel (Hogan, 1987).  
One after the other, multilateral organizations entered the arena (i.e., the United Nations 
Relief and Rehabilitation (UNRRA), Interim Aid; Government and Relief in Occupied Areas 
(GARIOA), The Export-Import Bank, and the World Bank (p. 33)) to assist in the Korean 
War. Figure 4 shows the projected and actual increase in output of selected commodities 
between 1948 and 1949. Somewhere between FY1946 and FY1953, tabulation for counterpart 
funds for commodity purchases developed erratically. Noticeably, ambiguous time and 
information varies from researchers pertaining to constructs surrounding the Marshall Plan. 
The United States had the latitude to question the amount of commodities: food, and 
fertilizer, energy, cotton, unprocessed goods, tobacco, machines, and vehicles. Table 2 shows 
the distribution of aid by commodities purchased from ERP funds delivered to Europe 
FY1948 and FY1951. The central question: for how many more missed opportunities can the 
United States the take credit?  
3.1. Missed opportunity or not? 
In spite of the Marshall Plan, “rhetoric of aid” to nation-states between 1948 and 1951 there 
is no methodical evidence to corroborate findings of increased productivity, economic 
growth, or the proliferation of trade (De Long & Eichengreen, 1993). The point is, because of 
the lack of time and inadequate statistics, the implementation of aid appropriation is 
unnoticeable. In opposition, US $1.7 billion program of grants and loans to European nation-
states to purchase U.S. products was an essential factor during West European postwar 
recovery (Tammen, 1990). The largest portion of Marshall Plan money covered imports of 
agricultural products, raw materials and semi-finished products (Kostrzewa, 1990).  
As aforementioned in section 3, aid implementation was at the discretion of Economic Council 
of Advisors (ECA) with nation-states; whereby, acquisitions and grants for support credits 
were deposited on counterpart coffers and accounts, subsequently used for debt reduction 
or domestic investments on behalf of nation-states. Consequently, these reserves enhanced 
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nation-states capacity to direct profits into local political campaigns, hence reinforcing state 
control over Western Europe’s economies, 13 while at the same time grossly undermining the 
effect of aid implementation. Simultaneously, the ECA Marshall Plan intensified internal 
policies of pacification. Further, it became the impelling cause of economic centralism in 
Germany, Italy, France, Austria, and Greece (Cowen, 1985, p. 66) which affected a 
propensity for corruption in Greece (p. 69). 
 
Figure 4. Projected and Actual Increase in Output of Selected Commodities 1948 and 194914 
 
Table 2. Distribution of Aid by Commodities Purchased from ERP delivery to Europe FY1948 and 
FY1951 
                                                                
13 Op. cit. 
14 Wexler, I. (1983). The Marshall Plan Revisited: The European Recovery Program. In: Economic Perspective. 
Westport/Comm.: Greenwood Press, 33-75. 
Commodity Projected Increase Actual increase 
Bread grains 46 42.1 
Coarse grains 12 16.9 
Sugar beets 26 40.1 
Coal 14 12.7 
Pig iron 68 62.8 
Steel 50 46.7 
Lead (metal) 78 61 
Zinc (metal) 45 25 
Tin (ores) 38 52 
Aluminum 37 27 
Cooper 16 0.9 
Electric Power 0.9 0.8 
3209.5
1552.41397.8
1883.1
444.5
1428.1 88.9
 Food and fertilizer
Energy
Cotton
Unprocessed goods
Tobacco
Machines and vehicles
Other
in USD million 
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Figure 2 illustrates aid-subjugated processes for commodities based on “projected -to -
actual” objectives. Originating from the project-to-actual total distributions as coarse grains, 
sugar beets, and tin (ores), relief volumes shown exceed the anticipated volumes, still the 
valuations do not support constructs for economic stability. Table 1 neither shows any 
relationship between nation-state acquisitions, nor grants for fiscal support. Yet, these 
illustrations point to probable cause of corruptibility from unmanaged policies. For instance, 
the British Isles, spanning four years, received the utmost subsidy by another nation-state in 
Europe, perhaps an undermining plan to extend their lifespan of colonialism. Similarly, 
Greece and Austria, the largest monetary recipients per capita, were inundated with 
inconsistent trade policies proxy by the United States, thus impeding economic recovery. 
Even more, Greece experienced an extraneous tobacco export from the United States, in 
succession losing millions to America’s volatile commercial market (p. 65). At the outset, the 
tobacco export volumes funded through the Marshall Plan and distributed to Greece 
dropped from 40 thousand tons to 2500 tons never to recover (p. 68). Unlike Greece, 
Belgium began to recover economically before the influx of Marshall Plan relief. Belgium 
actually achieved economic stabilization in the mid-40s; subsequently, it became a 
contributor to the rest of Europe (p. 66). Table 3 shows the USD balance of payment FY1949 - 
FY2005.  
 
1949 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2005 
Balance on Global Sourcing International (GSI) 38 27 15 20 -63 -391 -650 
Exports G+ S+I 96 138 233 649 872 1419 1612 
Imports G+S+I -59 -111 -218 -629 -935 -1809 -2261 
Unilateral Transfers -35 -38 -11 -16 -33 -54 -79 
US gov't grants and Pensions -32 -34 -7 -14 -17 -22 -35 
Private gifts -3 -3 -4 -2 -16 -33 -45 
US Assets Abroad -8 -24 -30 -162 -100 -581 -393 
Gov't Assets -7 -23 -1 16 
Foreign Securities -15 -36 -46 -152 -6 
US Bank & other lending -4 -96 -19 -302 -237 
Foreign Asset in US 0 12 22 109 152 1024 1116 
Foreign official assets net 29 42 38 164 
Foreign private Asset net 22 80 110 987 933 
Direct investment 32 60 288 101 
US Treasuries 5 -3 -53 184 
Other US securities 15 10 2 486 437 
US Bank & other Liabilities 7 33 51 266 211 
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1949 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2005 
Residual -5 -22 -4 -48 -45 -1 -6 
GDP at 2000 prices 1634 2471 3747 5133 7061 9708 11091 
Price indexes. 2000=1.00 0.17 0.21 0.27 0.53 0.81 1.00 1.09 
Table 3. Shows the United States Balance of Payments between FY1949 and FY200515 16 
By the mid-1950s, relief aimed to upturn European economic growth was destabilized. 
President Dwight Eisenhower’s administration marginalized humanitarian aid, 
concentrating on security assistance to strategic allies changing the landscape of foreign 
aid.17 The Economic Council of Advisors (ECA) instructed Marshall Plan recipients to 
contribute aid appropriations to a rearmament defense account and further requested a 
considerable alteration of their own economic resources from civilian to military production 
to gain reapportion (Wexler, 1983, p. 69). Finally, the problems attributable to the United 
States Marshall Plan throughout the implementation process are a result of unmanaged 
policies and limited capital. Consequently, the idea of the Marshall Plan was to transfer 
wealth from a technologically advanced nation to unindustrialized nation-states (Bandow, 
1994). Table 4 shows the discretionary budget appropriation and trends in Foreign Aid 
Funding Trends between FY1946 and FY1953; FY 1954 and FY1963; FY 1964 and FY1973; 
FY1974 and FY1985; FY 1986 and FY1996; FY 1997 and FY2006; FY 2007 and FY2010. The 
central question here is: were there missed opportunities by ECA to ensure investment 
egalitarianism between nation-states?  
 
Fiscal 
Year 
Billions of 
current US$ 
Billions of 
constant 2010$
As %of GDP
As % of 
Discretionary 
Budget Authority 
As % of Total 
Budget 
Authority 
1946 3.08 32.04 1.4 .00 .00 
1947 6.54 68.67 2.8 .00 .00 
1948 2.87 26.65 1.1 .00 .00 
1949 8.00 77.32 2.9 .00 .00 
1950 5.92 53.86 2.2 .00 .00 
                                                                 
15 United States Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstracts of the United States, Washington, D.C. successive editions 1950-2006. 
The table has been indexed against prices to more accurately present the relative size of the flows between 1949 and 
2005. Financial flows and foreign trade have grown far faster than GDP or government transfers have in 1950. Section 
1: Balance on goods, services, and investments income; Section 2: Unilateral transfers in relationship to gifts including 
Marshall Aid in 1949; Section 3: Change in US holdings of foreign assets; Section 4: Change in foreign holdings of US 
assets; Residual: are not included or unexplained, for example gold movement in 1949. 
16 Killick, J. (2008). The relevance of the Marshall Plan for the 21st Century, Chapter 6, Organization for Economic Co-
Operation and Development (OECD), Publications, at www.oecd.org/publishing/corrigenda, 77 -89. 
17 Bovard, J. (1986). The Continuing Failure of Foreign Aid, CATO Policy Analysis, 65, at 
www.cato.org/pubs/pas065.html, 1 -10 
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Fiscal 
Year 
Billions of 
current US$ 
Billions of 
constant 2010$
As %of GDP
As % of 
Discretionary 
Budget Authority 
As % of Total 
Budget 
Authority 
1951 7.34 62.36 2.3 .00 .00 
1952 6.64 52.16 1.9 .00 .00 
1953 4.47 36.59 1.3 .00 .00 
1954 4.59 32.45 1.2 .00 .00 
1955 3.72 27.89 0.9 .00 .00 
1956 4.25 32.00 1.0 .00 .00 
1957 3.99 28.83 0.9 .00 .00 
1958 3.38 22.89 0.7 .00 .00 
1959 4.23 28.97 0.9 .00 .00 
1960 4.21 27.66 0.8 .00 .00 
1961 4.52 29.13 0.9 .00 .00 
1962 5.09 33.21 0.9 .00 .00 
1963 5.13 32.24 0.9 .00 .00 
1964 4.22 26.16 0.7 .00 .00 
1965 4.24 25.82 0.6 .00 .00 
1966 5.03 30.29 0.7 .00 .00 
1967 4.56 26.79 0.6 .00 .00 
1968 4.03 22.98 0.5 .00 .00 
1969 3.54 18.90 0.4 .00 .00 
1970 3.47 17.93 0.3 .00 .00 
1971 4.19 20.04 0.4 .00 .00 
1972 4.32 19.89 0.4 .00 .00 
1973 4.53 20.11 0.3 .00 .00 
1974 6.97 28.46 0.5 .00 .00 
1975 5.43 20.31 0.3 .00 .00 
1976a 7.94 27.20 0.4 3.3 1.5 
1977 7.50 24.23 0.4 3.0 1.6 
1978 8.76 26.69 0.4 3.4 1.7 
1979 10.86 30.42 0.4 3.9 1.9 
1980 10.33 26.21 0.4 3.3 1.5 
1981 9.49 21.73 0.3 2.8 1.3 
1982 11.34 24.26 0.4 3.2 1.4 
1983 12.85 26.20 0.4 3.3 1.5 
1984 14.01 27.39 0.4 3.3 1.5 
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Fiscal 
Year 
Billions of 
current US$ 
Billions of 
constant 2010$
As %of GDP
As % of 
Discretionary 
Budget Authority 
As % of Total 
Budget 
Authority 
1985 20.23 38.41 0.5 4.4 2.0 
1986 14.30 26.36 0.3 3.3 1.4 
1987 13.12 23.32 0.3 2.9 1.3 
1988 13.62 23.34 0.3 3.0 1.2 
1989 12.96 21.39 0.2 2.8 1.1 
1990 14.09 22.61 0.2 2.8 1.1 
1991 15.84 24.39 0.3 2.9 1.1 
1992 13.34 19.65 0.2 2.5 0.9 
1993 12.48 17.84 0.2 2.4 0.8 
1994 12.23 17.17 0.2 2.4 0.8 
1995 12.29 16.78 0.2 2.5 0.8 
1996 11.12 14.88 0.1 2.2 0.7 
1997 11.11 14.55 0.1 2.2 0.7 
1998 12.55 16.32 0.1 2.4 0.7 
1999 14.84 19.06 0.2 2.6 0.8 
2000 14.50 18.19 0.1 2.5 0.8 
2001 14.78 18.10 0.1 2.2 0.8 
2002 14.64 17.69 0.1 2.0 0.7 
2003 25.17 29.76 0.2 3.0 1.1 
2004 38.18 44.02 0.3 4.2 1.6 
2005 21.95 24.50 0.2 2.2 0.8 
2006 23.60 25.50 0.2 2.4 0.8 
2007 26.85 28.30 0.2 2.5 0.9 
2008 28.20 28.68 0.2 2.4 0.8 
2009 26.42 37.09 0.3 2.4 0.9 
2010 39.39 39.39 0.3 3.2 1.1 
Table 4. The Discretionary Budget Appropriation and Trends between FY 1946 and FY201018 
                                                                 
18 The United States oversees Loans and Grants (Green Book), Office of Management and Budget Historic Budget 
Tables, FY2011 and FY2012 and beyond annual appropriations legislation and CRS calculations Notes: The data in this 
table for FY1946-1976 represent obligated funds reported in the USAID Green Book (the most reliable source for pre-
1970s data), while FY1977 –FY2010 are budget authority figures from the OMB Historic Budget Tables, reflecting the 
151 and 152 budge sub functions. The Green Book accounts included in the total have been selected by CRS to correlate 
with the function 151 and 152 budget accounts, allowing for accurate comparison over time: (a) FY1976 includes both 
regular FY1976 and transition quarter (TQ) funding, and the GDP calculation is based on the average FY1976 TQ GDP. 
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3.2. Missed opportunity or not? 
The absence of financial independence is not the cause of poverty, it is poverty; therefore, to 
have financial independence is synonymous with achieving economic wealth, not its 
precondition (Bauer, 1987). Nevertheless, scholars question whether there were missed 
opportunities by ECA to ensure investment egalitarianism. Anecdotally, post-World War II 
investment opportunities were scarce; consequently, the Marshall Plan might be credited for 
stimulating economic prosperity in Europe. Despite the efforts of the plan, proceeding 
Europe was destitute with infrequent resources. The level of sustainability lessened, making 
necessary repair to the railroads, buildings, and equipment utterly impossible. Further, they 
wanted fiscal reform in France and Italy, moderated by ECA austerity, predicated on the 
volume of counterpart investments that generated revenue for recipients’ nation-states. 
Conversely, ECA’s officials criticized counterpart apportionments to national and public 
companies (Bossuat, 2008). Nevertheless, propaganda forced ECA’s position; within two 
year’s monetary resources were relinquished to French, German, and Italian governments to 
gather important funds for the primary economic sectors (p. 20). Consequently, these 
conditions changed Marshall Funds to appropriation according to the Monnet Plan: a 
sociopolitical plan officially named, the theory of l’engrenage provisionally legalized the 
facilitation of, and redirection of coal–production from Germany’s existing coalmines in 
Ruhr and the Saar area to France.19  
In summary, ECA ensured investment egalitarianism. Evolution brought with it innovation. 
Following the implementation of a sociopolitical plan, propaganda further changed bilateral 
relations between the United States, France, and Germany and its allies. Because of 
evolution, ECA earmarked $6 billion grant to fund a revolutionary mechanism (e.g., Intra-
European trade), as a means to remove traditional barriers to multilateral trade, constructing 
all European currencies convertible. Fund allocations aid France, Italy, the U. K., and 
Belgium’s modernization efforts; inevitably, waiving some American rights and weakening 
its trade proposition. Further, ECA authorized $4 billion of the grant appropriations to 
European Payments Union (EPU) to balance payments to nation-states marking the era of a 
stabilized Europe (Machado, 2008, p. 45).  
4. Strength 
Arguably, the Marshall Plan has had various effects on nation-states; some European 
officials believe that, “it sped their recovery” in concurrence with its “initial recovery 
program.” Similarly, Americans suggest that the Marshall Plan eradicated famine, poverty, 
dogmatic anarchy, subverted communist terrorizations, and stabilized European nation-
states (Eichengreen, 2008). Literature reviews indicate that the acceptance of “Communist 
activities gradually decreased” in the years following the Marshall Plan (DeConde & Burns, 
2002). The Plan circumvented export- import trade barriers and created inroads that shaped 
the “North Atlantic Alliance that would persist throughout the Cold War.” Further helping 
                                                                 
19 Mr. Jean Monnet, The Time, November 16, 1979 
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Europeans reclaim confidence in social equipoise (Machado, 2008) and simultaneously 
reposing the minds of formidable critics. The Marshall Planners were mythical; they 
collaborated with European governments of the center and far right in Greece, of the center-
right in Italy and West Germany, and the left in Norway and the United Kingdom, 
concurrently cultivating propitious relations with the Royalists, Christian Democrats, 
Socialists, and Laborites (p. 55).  
The George Marshall Plan is ascribed to nationalized modernization in France, as defined in 
the Monnet Plan, whereby, 90% of funds went to revive the substructures of France, Germany, 
Britain, and Italy and to stimulate economic growth (Wall, 1993; Behrman, 2007). In addition, 
the United States contributed in excess of $12.5 billion in aid, and more than $500 billion as an 
equivalent to America’s gross national product (GNP) and $100 billion in grants. The United 
States worked purposelessly to evade actions contrary to their foremost interests (Marjolin, 
1989, p. 180). The Marshall Plan allowed for provisions of military support: tanks, planes, and 
guns to Britain and the Soviet Union to protect interest in modernization; as well, George 
Marshall was a principal architect of the D-Day attack of 1944 (Burns, 2008).20  
In response, the United States ECA ability fostered equalitarianism. The Marshall Plan aided 
European nation-states into forming the Organization for European Economic Cooperation 
(OECD) to improve inter-European Trade and multi-lateralizing payments concatenate with 
the European Payment Union (EPU). The unique function of EPU would expedite the 
conversion of European currencies to reach convertibility, trade liberation, and extracted 
trade bilateral practices. Perhaps a missed opportunity in the OECD and the Marshall Plan 
was the level of difficulty to differentiate between followers and their leaders, as described 
by Varaschin (2002). Nonetheless, modernization and the most recent American technology 
produced a model of international relations that produced an exchange of technology 
instead of one-way imports (Varaschin) 
In the wake of the Marshall Plan (ERP), the U.S. has maintained the same philosophy on 
foreign humanitarian aid: to prevent obdurate nation-states from tumultuous political, 
economic, and social conditions. In the twenty-first century, however, foreign humanitarian 
aid has become synonymous with national security, commercial interests, cataclysms, and 
social conflict. The scope of U.S. foreign humanitarian aid prohibits economic poverty, 
governance deficiency, incivility, and narcotic manufacturing and trafficking (Tarnoff & 
Lawson 2009). The question remains: has the Marshall Plan become a metaphor for 
earmarks, and eccentric government spending in the name of foreign humanitarian aid to 
persevere American society? To a point, foreign humanitarian aid has become a metaphor 
for earmarks. Earmarking is the redistribution of revenue used to invest in an explicit 
domestic or foreign commercial enterprise. Annually, by approval of the Department of 
State International Affairs, USAID, and other foreign affairs agencies earmark provisions 
(e.g., social infrastructure and economic substructure) are built-in financial plans as 
investment allowances from both bilateral and multilateral coffers.  
                                                                 
20 Burns, N. (2008). Commemorating the 60th Anniversary of the Marshall Plan, Chapter 9. The Marshall Plan: Lessons 
Learned for the 21st Century. 
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Case in point, in 2008, agencies’ financial plans totaled $36.2 billion. President Bush’s 
financial plan entreated $6 billion in extra subsidies for FY2007 to reserve earmarks not 
funded in the fiscal budget cycle: $1.18 billion for extra operating costs for the Department 
of State and other agencies, mainly linked to the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. 
Correspondingly, FY2007 subsidies included $4.81 billion to satisfy foreign aid requirements 
in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Lebanon, as well as peacekeeping and humanitarian aid in Sudan, 
Somalia and other indigenous nation-states. Moreover, in FY2008, the government 
requested $3.3 billion in war incremental funding for intervention in Iraq and Afghanistan, 
of which $1.37 billion was used to satisfy foreign aid and $1.93 billion for State Department 
operations. Between FY2001 and FY2008, foreign aid earmarks were contingent upon 
American society.21 Table 5 shows foreign humanitarian aid appropriations to the top nation 
state recipients between FY2001 and FY2010. The summary of U.S. foreign humanitarian aid 
further illustrates conditions for endowment appropriations to nation-states. Endowments 
are appropriated to nation-states in the form of cash transfers, equipment, commodities, 
infrastructure, or technical assistance, and in recent decades, are provided almost 
exclusively in the form of grants rather than loans (Tarnoff & Lawson 2011). Table 6 shows 
the top recipients of U.S. foreign humanitarian aid FY 2010. 
 
The Summary of U.S. Foreign Humanitarian Aid
Top Recipient Unite States 
(US$ in millions) 
FY 2010 2009 2008 2007 2006 2005 2004 2003 2002 2001 Notes 
Israel 
Economic 
Aid (ESF) 
400 781 398 120 240 1,537 477 600 1,080 838
One-third of all 
US Aid goes to 
Israel and 
Egypt - the 
majority of 
which pays for 
armaments, yet 
neither are 
developing 
nation-states 
Military 
Aid 
(FMF) 
2,775 2,550 2,381 2,340 2,280 1,448 2,147 2,100 2,040 1,975
Total 3,175 3,331 2,779 2,460 2,520 2,985 2,624 2,700 3,120 2,813
Egypt One-third of all 
US Aid goes to 
Israel and 
Egypt - the 
majority of 
which pays for 
armaments, yet 
neither are 
developing 
nation-states 
Economic 
Aid (ESF) 
250 200 412 455 495 530 571 615 775 693
Military 
Aid 
(FMF) 
1,300 1,300 1,289 1,300 1,300 1,289 1,292 1,300 1,300 1,297
Total 1,550 1,500 1,701 1,755 1,795 1,819 1,863 1,915 2,075 1,990
                                                                 
21 Congressional Budget Justification Foreign Operations FY2008 Retrieved on February 21 2012 at 
http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PCAAB546.pdf 
 
Globalization – Approaches to Diversity 152 
 FY 2007 2006 2005 2004 2003 2002 2001 Notes 
Data no longer 
available Economic 
Support Fund (ESF) -
Millennium Challenge 
Corporation (MCC)-
International Military 
Education and 
Training (IMET) -
Foreign Military 
Financing (FMF) -
International Narcotics 
Control and Law 
Enforcement (INCLE) -
Global Health and 
Child Survival (GHCS) 
- Development 
Assistance (DA)
Colombia 561 558 567 574 538 381 49 
Drug 
abatement 
Jordan 458 461 457 559 452 230 228 
to leave Israel 
alone 
Pakistan 734 698 537 387 305 893 3 
War on 
terrorism 
Peru 136 133 152 156 189 197 89 
Drug 
abatement 
Indonesia 159 158 135 122 131 124 120 Oil reserves 
Kenya 437 213 159 101 52 44 38 
Christian 
Donations 
Bolivia 122 122 132 133 137 126 89 
Drug 
abatement 
Ukraine 96 115 93 113 166 163 182 
India 117 94 92 87 152 79 59 
Haiti 225 163 125 101 26 31 48 
Russia 67 52 91 101 157 165 169 
Ethiopia 474 145 114 74 52 47 40 
West 
Bank/Gaza
69 150 74 74 75 72 70 
Aim to balance 
Israel aid 
Liberia 102 89 44 202 7 5 5 
Bangladesh 84 49 55 61 65 66 59  
Bosnia 43 51 45 64 53 68 86 Reparations 
Source PDF Report 
request 
122513.pdf
estimate 
122513.pdf
2010 122513.pdf Page 852, 2009 101368.pdf 
Table 5. Shows Foreign Humanitarian Aid to the Top United States between FY 2001 and FY 2010. 
 
United States Foreign Operations 2010-2012 ($US millions)
Total enacted 
2010
Total enacted 
2011
Obama's request 
for 2012
House Proposal 
for 2012
Senate Proposal 
for 2012 
USAID 
Administration 
1658.2 1526.9 1744.1 1124 1545 
Bilateral Economic 
Assistance 
25028.3 21208.9 23743.5 18899.2 21059.9 
Military/Security 
Assistance 
8267.2 8116.7 11322.8 9969.7 10714.8 
Multilateral 
Assistance 
2649.7 2302.6 3667.5 1573.9 3218.6 
Table 6. Shows the Top Recipients of U.S. Foreign Humanitarian Aid FY 2010.22 
                                                                 
22 U.S. Department of State, Report of Foreign Operations CBJ FY2002, FY 2011. Foreign Aid: Introduction to U. S. 
Programs and Policy: Congressional Research Service (CRS)-included supplemental and Millennium Challenge 
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Figure 5. Shows the United States Foreign Operations 2010-2012 ($US millions). 
The Marshall Plan European Recovery Program’s aim to modernize the European economy 
and to revitalize free enterprise post-war, found itself in stark contrast, to its intent. By 1952, 
as funding gradually depleted given the inconclusive economics of recipient nation-states, 
economists could not differentiate through direct nor indirect appropriation how 
prosperous Europe might have become without it (Eichengreen, 2008). Particularly in lieu of 
“the shift to remilitarization after the Korean War,” results were even less conclusive 
(Marchado, 2008). The Marshall Plan was not an isolated strategy of assistance, but rather an 
exclusive act beginning a sequence of postwar aid that included United Nations Relief and 
Rehabilitation. 
This chapter session presents a critical assessment of the concept of foreign humanitarian 
assistance programs as defined in “the Marshall Plan,” and administrated during the post-
War to address the following questions:  
1. Has the United States missed opportunities to rebuild nation-states through foreign 
humanitarian aid programs without the presupposition of hopelessness?  
2. Has the United States missed opportunities for “workfare rather than welfare systems” 
to avoid supposition of social imperialism?  
3. Has the Marshall Plan’s (ERP) reputation outlined its grandeur?  
4. Is it possible for the United States to structure modernized programs that will not 
exceed its resources; whereat stability in education and employment can exist and 
                                                                                                                                                                   
Corporation Compact disbursement in FY 2010, (February 2011), 7-5700, Retrieved on February 2, 2012 at 
www.crs.gov, 1 -31.  
Afrhanistan, 
4102
Colombia, 507
Egypt, 1296
Ethiopia, 533
Haiti, 1271
Iraq, 
1117
Israel, 2220
Jordan, 693
Kenya, 688
Nigeria, 614
Pakistan, 1807
South Africa, 578
Tanzania, 464 Uganda, 457 West Bank/Gaza, 
496 (in US$ millions)
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wherefore social resilience is enough to obliterate nation-states’ dependency on 
humanitarian assistance programs?  
 
Key International Aid and Humanitarian Aid Accounts for 2011 (US $ in millions) 
 
Total 
enacted 2011 
Obama vs. 2011 
spending 
House vs. 2011 
spending 
Senate vs. 
2011 
spending 
Global health and child survival 7829.3 11% -9% 1% 
Development assistance 2520 16% -18% 1% 
International disaster & famine 
assistance 
863.3 0% -12% 16% 
Migration & refugee assistance 1686.6 -4% -11% 7% 
Emergency migration & refugee 
assistance 
49.9 -36% -36% -100% 
Millennium Challenge 
Corporation 
898 25% 0% 0% 
International Narcotics control & 
law enforcement 
1593.8 58% 55% 39% 
Nonproliferation, anti-terrorism, 
demining 
738.5 -4% -4% -3% 
Foreign military financing 5374.2 22% 19% 18% 
Peacekeeping operations 304.4 -4% 0% -4% 
World Bank global 
environmental facility 
89.8 60% -22% 34% 
International clean technology 
fund 
184.6 117% -100% 90% 
Strategic climate fund 49.9 281% -100% 100% 
World Bank international 
development association 
1232.5 10% -24% 10% 
Global food security fund 99.8 209% -100% 100% 
International fund for 
agricultural development 
29.5 2% -33% 2% 
International organizations & 
programs 
354.3 -2% -13% 0% 
Figure 6. Shows the key International and Humanitarian Aid Accounts for 2011 (US $ in millions).23 24 
5. The marshall plan criticism 
The United States has pontificated on the inevitability of bombastic aid to rebuild nation-
states without the presupposition of hopelessness. Virtually sixty-five years later the 
sequence of deficiency is uninterrupted. According to German political analyst, Werner 
Abelshauser, the United States was the primary economic imperialist orchestrating 
                                                                 
23 Congressional Research Service, 2011: figures include funds flagged for “overseas contingency operations” (OCO). 
24 Ibid.  
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humanitarian aid distributions to control Europe. He contends foreign aid was neither 
Europe’s indicator of recovery or sustainability.  
For example, the economic recoveries in France, Italy, and Belgium existed before the stream 
of U.S. aid (Cowen, 1985). Belgium, a nation that depended the most on unrestricted 
exchanges of economic policies after its liberation in 1944, experienced the fastest recovery, 
eluded a collapse in its housing market and food scarcities seen in other European nations.25 
Alan Greenspan explicated in his memoir, The Age of Turbulence, that Ludwig Erhard’s trade 
and industry strategies accelerated Western European growth. Erhard’s modification to 
trade and industry modus operandi legitimized Germany’s recovery, and those strategies 
jumped-started Western Europe and its allies to rebuild institutions and a nation.26 
Conversely, there is an inherent bias of government-to-government aid towards state 
control and politicization (Bauer, 1981). This session argues the legitimacy of nation-states’ 
foreign humanitarian aid and aid distribution. 
The United States’ foreign humanitarian aid has become the “opiate” for nation-states. 
Independent of how inattentive, unscrupulous, or autocratic a nation-state may be, there is 
always some administration or global agency motivated to supply aid (i.e., bilateral, 
multilateral, and unilateral benefactors) with a few more million dollars. By subsidizing 
political and pernicious policies, foreign aid ill serves the worlds’ impoverished.27 For instance, 
in Indonesia, the government-usurped sharecroppers ‘produced for aid-financed irrigation 
canals. In Mali, sharecroppers were coerced to auction their harvests at bargain prices to joint 
aid projects and to further Mali government initiatives. In Egypt, Haiti, and elsewhere, the 
values for sharecroppers harvest plummeted as the United States intervened with aid (p. 2).  
Alesina and Weder (1999) said global programs to alleviate poverty (e.g., bilateral aid from 
richer to poorer nation-states, multilateral aid from international organizations, grants at 
below market rates, technical assistance, and debt forgiveness) in fact increase the chance of 
parliamentary exploitation.28 The Marshall Plan initially perpetuated unscrupulous 
propagandized schemes.29 In retort, critics of these programs argue instead that, contrary to 
the more or less sincere intentions of the donors, corrupt governments received just as much 
aid as less corrupt ones (p. 3). These issues are perpetual; often-financial assistance does not 
reach the needy in the developing nations, but instead is wasted on inefficient public 
consumption.30 For instance, appropriations given to France and the Netherlands totaled 
resources used to finance their military forces in Southeast Asia inaugurating the context for 
the largest sums of private U. S. investments in Europe, creating the groundwork for 
modern transnational corporations (Chomsky & Ruggiero, 2002, p. 9). Modern transnational 
                                                                 
25 A Marshall Plan for Iraq? (http://www.cato.org/research/articles/vasquez-030509.html). CATO Institute, May 9, 2003, 
by Ian Vasquez. Retrieved February 23, 2012. 
26 Greenspan, A. (2007). The Age of Turbulence Adventures in a New World. The Penguin Press New York, ISBN 1-7-4295-
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27 Ibid 16. 
28 Alesina, A. & Weder, B. (May 1999). Do Corrupt Governments Receive Less foreign Aid? at 
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29 Tucker, J. (1997). The Marshall Plan Myth, The Free Market, 15:9. 
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corporations are estimated as twenty-nine to fifty-one of the world’s 100 largest economic 
entities; the remainders are nations-states excluding the gross domestic production of sub-
Saharan Africa whereby its revenues do not equal that of General Motors and Ford 
collectively.31 Because corporations and stats are commonly represented as having an 
oppositional relationship, scholars have observed the effects of a new phenomenon of 
globalization on the process of colonization (Mclean, 2004, p. 363). The effect of globalization 
relative to colonization is not discussed in this chapter.  
Accordingly, Kahin (2003) wrote that the Netherlands used a significant portion of the aid it 
received to re-conquer Indonesia during the Indonesian National Revolution, and then forced 
them to join the Korean War in 1950 after pressuring them to surrender or lose aid if they did 
not comply. 32 These examples emphasize an unequivocal contradiction of egalitarianism.  
The myriad of foreign aid was created on the premise that foreign government is dedicated 
to its naturalized citizens’ welfare. The premise has proven to be a meager supposition of 
social imperialism. Suppositions of social imperialism are the remnants of rancorous 
philosophies on the part of nation-states and foreign aid systems of government that 
describe the impalpable interest of naturalized citizen.33 For example, aid projects in 
Guatemala failed partly because some Guatemalan government officials opposed improving 
the plight of the rural impoverished.34 A million people starved in the Sudan in 1985 because 
the government-owned railroad refused to transport American-donated food.35 In Africa, 
where tribal rivalries often still prevail, aid money was used to prop up the reigning factions 
in the same way that local American political machines use federal grants as slush funds; an 
increase in the accolades of political conflict in contemporary Africa and less urbanized 
environments, as described by Bauer (1984). Therefore, there is an outlining presumption 
that the United States has consciously continued to finance an exorbitant quantity of coffers 
to entice foreign government to not commit economic suicide.36  
Generally, foreign investments were interchangeable when outside entities (i.e., multilateral 
organizations) made cash accessible to recipient governments, consecutively releasing their 
revenue for other purposes. For instance, Ghana, Brazil, Kenya, and the Ivory Coast spent 
billions building new capital cities. In addition to alluring industrialized corporations to 
their nation-states, for example, Mercedes-Benz automobiles were very popular among 
African government officials; whereby the etymology of Swahili has been changed labeling 
officials as wabenzi (men of the Mercedes-Benz). The point being, foreign aid has made life 
more pleasurable for government bureaucrats in impoverished nation-states. At the same 
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33 Schumpeter, J. (November 2011). Imperialism and Social Classes: Two Essays (LVMI) [Kindle Edition], Ludwig von 
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time, it has done little to promote the proliferation of “workfare rather than welfare 
systems,” to breed political responsibility, or to encourage nation-states to help themselves.37 
Why has the United States requested taxes from its citizens to fund churlish foreign nations?  
The United States is unswerving to the United Nations and to multilateral international 
relations to safeguard global solidarity. In 2011, the United States earmarked for United 
Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), to increase most 
multilateral coffers and accounts, the sum of US $130 million for Global Environment Facility 
(GEF). A different earmarked designation for the 2013 proposed budget of US $1.65 billion to 
support Global Fund fight on AIDS, TB, and Malaria. In addition, the United States Congress 
aims to spend US $250 million for debt relief for the world’s most insolvent nation-states.  
In 2012, American taxpayers, for the purpose of the UNESCO, GEF, and Middle East 
Funding Initiative, provided in excess of US $1 billion to USAID in response to the “Arab 
Awakening”38 in Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Syria, and Bahrain. The 
United States assumes the position of securing the sovereignty for Americans, and to 
support nation-states where tumult has evolved. Both the US House and Senate earmarked 
$7 billion dollars from their proposed 2013 budget to create a contingency fund for global 
war on terror and for administrative support in the Middle East.39 The question: What is the 
purpose of the United States overtaxing Americans? Are taxable incomes used to build 
nation-states? Why are foreign governments given incentives to operate ethically?  
As cited previously, the Marshall Plan had been a multilateral approach to problem solving. 
It was conceived as institution building and nation building, but within the constructs of 
regional economic integration, appropriations increased from 17 to 149 nation-states, with 
an expectation of self-governance to eliminate xenophobia. Perhaps this plan was too 
optimistic rather than pragmatic on the part of the United States. Conversely, in the 
implementation stage of the Marshall Plan, economists have since observed that not all 16 
Arab states in the Middle East were included in planned initiatives. The absence of a single 
democratic government among them poses a threat to the United States; as a result, the 
rhetorical question of international reverence and legitimacy has been posed. 40  
6. Threats 
Arguably, it is difficult to oppose fundamental aid to relieve societies who are currently 
underprivileged under an authoritarian regime, or struggling to gain the sense of tolerance 
and prosperity that Americans value. In theory, military means will not suffice when it 
comes to ending the terrorism that threatens the United States and its allies, or halting the 
insurgencies that destabilize the Middle East (Etzioni, n.d.). It is fitting in this session to 
concisely discuss the Middle East’s (i.e., Iraq, Iran, and Afghanistan) social position on 
foreign aid, and egalitarianism. Moreover, this does not mean that terrorism and insurgency 
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can end by military means. Instead, it means that nonmilitary means will have to be the 
primary recourse to ending terrorism rather than methods used following World War II (p. 
76) or tactics seen in the twenty-first century.  
It is further noteworthy to mention that the Middle East does not oppose financial aid or 
economic resources from the United States; however, the Middle East does oppose 
conditions associated with relief from the United States. Including, but not limited to, 
radical public and political reform and security interference, which has placed these former 
allies on a very different historical trajectory.41 For instance, the Pakistani government 
resented the conditions for building a civil society that were a part of the 2009 Kerry-Lugar 
Bill. The 2009 Kerry-Lugar Bill mandated $7.5 billion in aid through 2014. The Egyptian 
government opposed the United States interference when USAID solicited help for job 
creation, economic development, and poverty alleviation including civic activism and 
human rights on behalf of the Middle East.42 As a result, the Middle East government 
continued to oppose the United States developmental models as inappropriate for their 
nation and recommended germane models similar to the Chinese or other relevant models.43  
As a result, Iranian relations with Afghanistan have been compromised, due to Iran’s 
relationship with the United States. The irony is, every one-share concerns about Iraq’s oil 
politics and Afghanistan’s role in the Islamic realm. Accordingly, Iran has repudiated 
Afghanistan as a peer of the realm. Therefore, although Iran supported the United States’ 
conquest of the Taliban in 2001 and the dethroning Saddam Hussein in Iraq in 2003, the 
Iranian government has opposed the United States troops left over in both Afghanistan and 
Iraq, dreading permanent residency and retaliation.44 To underscore the problems, the Afghan 
and United States governments remain at odds over strategic intentions of Afghanistan’s 
neighbors and the policies needed to engage them. For Afghanistan, Iran is an ally and 
Pakistan is an enemy; whereas, for the United States, Iran is an enemy and Pakistan an ally. 45 
7. Recommendation 
The United States legislative bodies continue to be divided over the legitimacy of foreign 
humanitarian aid programs and the proportions of the federal investments used to fund 
them. The divide is between those who want to eliminate foreign aid versus those who want 
to increase reserve delineation, to improve program proficiency, and to lessen taxpayers’ 
liability. This session of the chapter describes methods to achieve objectives. This process 
has the proclivity to procure billions in taxable revenue, if desired, to eliminate unnecessary 
regulations that foster inefficient expenditures. Emmy Simmons, in her manuscript, 
Monetization of Food Aid: Reconsidering U.S. Policy and Practice, describes the following 
solutions to improve global foreign aid relations: 
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Global Humanitarian 
Foreign Aid 
Recommendation 1  Decrease the usage of monetization, thereby developing direct processes 
that control food aid distribution to the more than one billion hungry 
people worldwide.46  
 Modify monetization to the congressionally mandated minimum of 15 
percent for Public Law 480 Title II; Section 416(b)47 nonemergency food 
aid and Public Law 83-66448; reduce earmark from 30 percent to 15 
percent to procure food in local markets. 
 Eliminate monetization for Food for Progress and McGovern-Dale in 
International Food for Education and Child Nutrition programs.49 
Recommendation 2  Keep the budget used to procure U.S food at its current levels for a net 
increase in direct distribution to assist those in emergencies. 
 Appropriate $280 million in different coffers to the International Affairs 
150 account for development assistance. 
 Allocate coffers to private volunteer organizations (PVOs) to support 
food security programs and complementary development activities. 50 51 
Monetization of the United States’ in-kind food aid is the sale of food commodities 
purchased, shipped from the United States, and sold into foreign markets. These processes 
include assistance from U.S. based non-governmental organizations (NGOs). In accordance, 
these practices generate revenues on local currencies introduced in the Food Security Act of 
1985 as a method to support PVOs in order to recuperate administration, transportation, 
distribution, and storage costs linked to food aid dissemination.52 Monetization is a type of 
food aid, in accordance to World Vision and international NGO, defined as “all food-
supported processes aimed at improving the food security of people living in poverty over a 
time, whether funded by means of international, national, public, or private resources.”53 
Conversely, the process of monetizing can be useful for promoting low-cost, viable food 
markets by boosting investment in transportation, infrastructure, and human capital (traders, 
entrepreneurs). Essentially, food aid monetization can improve long-term food security by 
                                                                 
46 2012 World Hunger and Poverty Facts and Statistics at 
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reassuring competitive food marketing systems that have built-in incentives to provide the 
poor with affordable food.54 Today the United States reinforced its commitment to food aid 
and monetization for nonemergency development through the 2008 Farm Bill. As a result, the 
Farm Bill provides concurrent earmarks for nonemergency Title II programs: $375 million in 
FY2009, $400 million in FY2010, $425 million in FY2011, $450 million FY2012 (Section 3021).55 
Theoretically, expansive subsidy systems foster American sovereignty. In reality, the United 
States could not be more in control, or secured following the threat of 9/11. Globally, the 
United States yields the most expensive food of any other multilateral organization without 
question: It has the capability to eliminate agricultural subsidies. The United States could 
lessen the impact of subsidies maneuvering for a better position and expurgate 
appropriations without jeopardizing its market position if it chooses to do so. The adverse 
effect of Congress’ inability to relinquish control impedes aid agencies ability to seize 
different opportunities to modernize programs or ripostes to global emergencies. Therefore, 
it stand to reason that neither Europe, nor its allies are incapable of jettisoning humanitarian 
assistance programs. The central question: is there a need to modernize the Marshall Plan?  
8. Conclusion 
No one can rebut the gist of economic growth, institutional reconstruction, cultivation of 
external and internal affiliations, or ethicality, of indoctrinating indigenous military and 
police forces to keep us safe; they are indispensable. Yet, is there a need to modernize the 
Marshall Plan? Let take a brief look at the Marshall Plan and its impact: 
1. It did not provide an economic package that gave nation-states sanguinity beyond 
current processes. 
2. It did not provide long-term centralized processes for implementation. 
3. It did not provide political stability or a comprehensive legitimate milieu. 
4. It did not provide aid equitably, reconcile global affiliations, or eradicate global 
deficiency collectively. 
5. It has not rectified didactic organizations, yet, it has multiplied in aid agencies (i.e., 
bilateral, multilateral, unilateral). 
6. It has provided prominence of dominating nation-states’ socioeconomics and 
sociolinguistics. 
7. It has served as a cushion for reform bills.  
Because the United States is the greatest beneficiary of the Marshall Plan, the best ever foreign 
assistance throughout the developing world proves that aid may be best served, as a cushion 
for reform; but, it can never substitute the soundness of domestic economic policies.56 
However, one should realize that such resources aim to alleviate immediate suffering; the 
reconstruction that follows should begin and end at home (Narozhna, 2001, p.7). 
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